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Abstract. This paper addresses two substantive issues: (1) Does the magnitude of
the expectation eﬀect of regime switching in monetary policy depend on a particular
policy regime? (2) Under which regime is the expectation eﬀect quantitatively im-
portant? Using two canonical DSGE models, we show that there exists asymmetry
in the expectation eﬀect across regimes. The expectation eﬀect under the dovish
policy regime is quantitatively more important than that under the hawkish regime.
These results suggest that the possibility of regime shifts in monetary policy can
have important eﬀects on rational agents’ expectation formation and on equilibrium
dynamics. They oﬀer a theoretical explanation for the empirical possibility that a
policy shift from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime may not be the main source
of substantial reductions in the volatilities of inﬂation and output.
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[Lucas (1976)] has expressed the view that it makes no sense to think
of the government as conducting one of several possible policies while at
the same time assuming that agents remain certain about the policy rule
in eﬀect.
Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984, p. 468)
Explicit modelling of the connection of expectation-formation mecha-
nisms to policy [regime] in an accurately identiﬁed model would allow
better use of the data.
Sims (1982, p. 120)
I. Introduction
Consider monetary policy that follows a Taylor rule, in which the nominal interest
rate is adjusted to respond to its own lag and deviations of inﬂation from its target value
and of output from its trend. Suppose there are two monetary policy regimes, where
the interest rate responds to inﬂation more strongly in the second regime (a hawkish
regime) than it does in the ﬁrst regime (a less hawkish or dovish regime). In this
policy environment, it is often assumed that when monetary policy enters a particular
regime, rational agents naively believe that the regime will prevail indeﬁnitely (see, for
example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and
Giannoni (2006)). This assumption, however, does not square well with the rational
expectations view in that agents form expectations based on all available information,
including possible changes in future policy. This point has been elaborated by Sims
(1982), Sargent (1984), Barro (1984), Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984), and Sims
(1987), among others. These authors argue that in an economy where past changes
in monetary policy rules are observable and future changes are likely, rational agents’
information set should include a probability distribution over possible policy shifts
in the future. The diﬀerence between equilibrium outcome from a model that ignores
probabilistic shifts in future policy regime and that from a model that takes into account
such expected changes in regime reﬂects the key expectation-formation aspect of the
Lucas critique, as implied by the antecedent two epigraphs. We call this diﬀerence the
“expectation eﬀect of regime shifts” in monetary policy.
This paper answers two theoretical questions that are of substantive importance.
Is the magnitude of the expectation eﬀect of regime switching the same across policy
regimes? If not, under which regime the expectation eﬀect is quantitatively important
or unimportant? To answer the ﬁrst question, we obtain closed-form solutions for twoASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 3
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, one is a stylized ﬂexible-price
model and the other is a canonical sticky-price model. Our main ﬁnding is that the
importance of the expectation eﬀect depends on monetary policy regime. In particular,
we show that no matter whether the price is sticky or not, the expectation eﬀect of
regime switching under the hawkish policy regime is smaller than that under the dovish
regime. The farther apart the two policy regimes, the larger the diﬀerence between the
expectation eﬀects under the two regimes.
To quantify the importance of the expectation eﬀect on dynamics of inﬂation and
output, we simulate the sticky-price model with several sources of plausible frictions.
Our simulated results show that the magnitude of the expectation eﬀect depends more
on how strong propagation mechanisms are and less on how persistent the prevailing
regime is. The stronger the propagation mechanism is, the more impact on inﬂation and
output the expectation of future regime change has. While in theory the expectation
eﬀect disappears if the prevailing regime lasts indeﬁnitely, we ﬁnd that in practice the
expectation eﬀect under the dovish policy regime is quantitatively important even if
the regime is very persistent. This conclusion holds for diﬀerent models and under
diﬀerent scenarios, as shown in Section IV.
The asymmetry in the expectation eﬀect of regime switches in monetary policy pro-
vides a theoretical insight into the empirical diﬃculty of ﬁnding changes in monetary
policy as a main source of substantial reductions in macroeconomic volatility (Stock
and Watson, 2003; Sims and Zha, 2006; Cecchetti, Hooper, Kasman, Schoenholtz, and
Watson, 2007). This expectational asymmetry arises because either the hawkish stance
of monetary policy in place or the expectation of switching to hawkish policy in the
future inﬂuences agents’ inﬂation expectations in a nonlinear way. As the expectation
eﬀect under the dovish regime can considerably alter the dynamics of key macroe-
conomic variables, caution needs to be taken in interpreting empirical models that
are used to ﬁt a subsample that covers only the dovish regime. In the hawkish policy
regime, on the other hand, the expectation eﬀect is small even if agents expect that the
regime will shift to the dovish regime with a non-trivial probability, as hawkish policy
itself anchors inﬂation expectations. Thus, even if a newly instituted hawkish regime
is not perfectly credible, such as the Volcker disinﬂation studied by Erceg and Levin
(2003) and Goodfriend and King (2005), inﬂation ﬂuctuations can still be eﬀectively
stabilized.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 4
II. Relation to the Literature
There has been a growing strand of literature on Markov-switching rational expec-
tations models. Examples include Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha
(2003), Schorfheide (2005), Svensson and Williams (2005), Farmer, Waggoner, and
Zha (2006), and Davig and Leeper (2007). Following that strand of literature, we
generalize the standard DSGE model by allowing the possibility of changes in policy
regime to be part of the economic information set.
1 Those earlier papers, however,
did not study the asymmetric aspect of expectation eﬀects of regime switching and
how important quantitatively such an asymmetry is in explaining some empirical ﬁnd-
ings on the eﬀects of monetary policy changes. Nor did those papers study diﬀerent
implications of the expectation eﬀect under diﬀerent regimes and the role of diﬀerent
propagation mechanisms in the asymmetry of expectation eﬀects.
Our paper is related to but diﬀerent from the issues of indeterminacy (determinacy)
of the equilibrium, which are the focus of the earlier work by Davig and Leeper (2007)
and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2008). First, there exists no theoretical result in
the literature regarding determinacy vs. indeterminacy for Markov-switching DSGE
models, like ours in this paper, that involve lagged endogenous variables such as con-
sumption and inﬂation.
2 Second, the asymmetry of expectation eﬀects exists no matter
whether the equilibrium is unique or not. The dovish regime in our paper does not
necessarily correspond to an indeterminate regime; it simply represents a less hawkish
regime. Even if monetary policy in both regimes raises the interest-rate instrument
more than one for one in response to inﬂation, there exists the asymmetry of expecta-
tion eﬀects across regimes as shown in Section IV.4.
The equilibrium in our regime-switching model is not always determinate and in the
case of indeterminacy one needs to select an equilibrium. The particular equilibrium
selection device we focus on in this paper is the minimum-state-variable (MSV) solu-
tion used, for example, by McCallum (1983), Svensson and Williams (2005), Farmer,
1We view this kind of regime-switching structural model as a starting point to study the quantitative
importance of expectation eﬀects of regime switching in monetary policy, as emphasized by Sims and
Zha (2006) and Cecchetti, et al. (2007). An interesting issue that remains to be addressed is to what
extent the probability of a regime shift is aﬀected by the state of the economy or by the factors other
than economic ones. This issue, deserving a separate investigation, is beyond the scope of this paper.
2In the context of a simple Markov-switching new-Keynesian model that does not involve any lagged
endogenous variables, the debate on whether or not there is determinacy of the equilibrium and on
how one should restrict one’s attention to a subset of equilibria can be found in Davig and Leeper
(2007) and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2008).ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 5
Waggoner, and Zha (2006), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006). It is important, however,
to understand other solutions (i.e., sunspot solutions) and their impact on equilibrium
dynamics. As shown in Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2007), there always exists a scale
parameter in sunspot solutions that can arbitrarily aﬀect the magnitude of the impact
of a sunspot shock on inﬂation and output. Consequently, the expectation eﬀect of a
regime shift can be arbitrarily large or arbitrarily small, depending on the arbitrary
value of this scale parameter. For this economic reason, we restrict the expectation
eﬀects to the MSV solution that concerns fundamental shocks only.
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining the theoretical properties and
quantitative importance of the expectation eﬀect of regime shifts in monetary policy.
If the expectation eﬀect turns out to be quantitatively unimportant, as in our hawkish
regime, the equilibrium outcome in a model that ignores changes in future policy regime
can be nevertheless a good approximation to the rational expectations equilibrium. If
the expectation eﬀect is quantitatively large, however, it is crucial to assess the impacts
of the possibility of regime shifts on the equilibrium dynamics of inﬂation and output, as
in our dovish regime. Our ﬁnding that the quantitative importance of the expectation
eﬀect depends on policy regime provides theoretical insights that help interpret the
eﬀects of monetary policy across diﬀerent regimes.
III. Theoretical Results
To obtain closed-form analytical results of key properties of the expectation eﬀect,
we study two canonical DSGE models, one with ﬂexible prices and one with sticky
prices. Using the closed-form results, we show that our theoretical conclusions hold for
both types of models.
III.1. The ﬂexible-price model. Consider an endowment economy in which a one-










subject to the budget constraint
PtCt + Bt = PtYt + Rt¡1Bt¡1;
where Ct denotes consumption, Yt denotes the endowment, Pt denotes the price level,
Bt denotes the agent’s holdings of the bond, and Rt¡1 denotes the nominal interest
rate between period t ¡ 1 and t. The parameter ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount
factor and the parameter ° > 0 measures the relative risk aversion. The endowmentASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 6
grows at a constant rate: Yt+1=Yt = ¸. The preference shock At follows the stationary
stochastic process
lnAt = ½a lnAt¡1 + "at; (1)
where ½a 2 (¡1;1) and "at is an i.i.d. normal process with mean zero and variance ¾2
a.











which describes the trade-oﬀ between spending a dollar today for current consumption
and saving a dollar for future consumption.






where ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 is the inﬂation rate, ¼¤ denotes the inﬂation target, st denotes the
realization of monetary policy regime in period t, Ást is a regime-dependent parameter
that measures the aggressiveness of monetary policy against deviations of inﬂation from
its target, and · is a constant. Monetary policy regime follows a Markov-switching
process between two states: a dovish regime characterized by st = 1 and 0 · Á1 < 1
and a hawkish regime by st = 2 and Á2 > 1. The transition probabilities for the regime







where qij = Prob(st+1 = ijst = j). Each column of Q sums up to 1 so that q21 = 1¡q11
and q12 = 1 ¡ q22.
Market clearing implies that Ct = Yt and Bt = 0 for all t. Using the goods market










Thus, higher consumption (or income) growth requires a higher real interest rate.
III.1.1. Steady state and equilibrium dynamics. An equilibrium in this economy is sum-
marized by the Euler equation (5) and the monetary policy rule (3). Since the endow-
ment is exogenous, the variables of interest include the inﬂation rate ¼t and the nominal
interest rate Rt.
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We focus on the steady state in which the actual inﬂation equals the inﬂation target
(i.e., ¼ = ¼¤). It follows from the Euler equation that the steady-state nominal interest
rate is given by R = ¸°
¯ ¼¤: As is evident from the interest rate rule (3), the monetary
authority is able to achieve the inﬂation target in the steady state if it sets · = ¸°
¯ ¼¤.
Thus, although monetary policy switches between the two regimes, the steady-state
solution does not depend on policy regime and thus allows us to log-linearize the
equilibrium conditions around the constant steady state.
Log-linearizing the Euler equation (5) around the steady state results in
^ Rt = Et^ ¼t+1 + °(1 ¡ ½a)^ at; (6)
where ^ Rt and ^ ¼t denote the log-deviations of the nominal interest rate and the inﬂation
rate from steady state and ^ at = lnAt. A positive preference shock raises the real
interest rate since a rise in ^ at implies a stronger desire for consumption relative to
saving and thus interest rate rises. Log-linearizing the interest rate rule (3) around the
deterministic steady state leads to
^ Rt = Ást^ ¼t: (7)
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain the single equation that describes inﬂation dynamics:
Ást^ ¼t = Et^ ¼t+1 + °(1 ¡ ½a)^ at; st 2 f1;2g: (8)
III.1.2. The equilibrium solution. The state variable in the simple model (8) is the
preference shock ^ at. Thus the solution takes the form ¼t = ®st^ at, where ®st is to be
solved for st 2 f1;2g. Denote
A =
"
Á1 ¡ ½aq11 ¡½aq21
¡½aq12 Á2 ¡ ½aq22
#
:
The following proposition gives the closed-form solution.
Proposition 1. The MSV solution to the regime-switching model (8) is given by












with the implicit assumption that the matrix A is invertible.
Proof. See Appendix B.1. ¤ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 8
The solution represented by (9) implies that the volatility, measured by the standard












III.1.3. Expectation eﬀects. The solution (9) takes into account possible switches of
future policy regime. This solution in general diﬀers from that obtained under the
simplifying assumption that agents believe that the current regime will continue per-
manently. The diﬀerence between these two solutions is what we call the expectation
eﬀect of regime switching.
To examine the underlying forces that drive the expectation eﬀect, we consider the
solution that rules out regime shifts in future policy, which is equivalent to solving the
following model
Áj^ ¼t = Et^ ¼t+1 + °(1 ¡ ½a)^ at; (10)
where Áj (j = 1;2) does not depend on time. Equilibrium condition (10) is a special
case of condition (8) with qjj = 1 for j 2 f1;2g. The solution to (10) is given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. The MSV solution to the model described in (10) is
^ ¼t = ¹ ®j^ at; ¹ ®j =
°(1 ¡ ½a)
Áj ¡ ½a
; j 2 f1;2g; (11)
where it is assumed that Áj 6= ½a.
Proof. See Appendix B.2. ¤
The solution represented by (11) implies that the volatility of inﬂation under the












The following proposition establishes the existence and the properties of the ex-
pectation eﬀects of regime shifts in monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, we show that the
volatility of inﬂation in the dovish regime decreases with the probability of switching
to the hawkish regime and that the volatility of inﬂation in the hawkish regime in-
creases with the probability of switching to the dovish regime. Thus, the expectation
of regime switch aﬀects inﬂation dynamics.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 9








where we assume that Á1 > ½a so that ¹ ®j > 0 for j 2 f1;2g.
Proof. See Appendix B.3. ¤
The expectation eﬀect of regime switches can be measured by the magnitude j®j¡¹ ®jj
for j = 1;2. Because ¹ ®j does not depend on transition probabilities, Proposition 3
implies that the less persistent the regime j is, the more signiﬁcant the expectation
eﬀect j®j ¡ ¹ ®jj becomes.
III.1.4. Asymmetry. As one can see from (9), ®j is nonlinear in the model parameters.
This nonlinearity implies that when the probabilities of switching are the same for both
regimes (i.e., when q11 = q22), the expectation eﬀect may not be symmetric across the
two regimes. This result is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that q11 = q22. If Á1 > ½a and ®1;®2 > 0, then
¹ v¼;1 ¡ v¼;1





Proof. See Appendix B.4. ¤
In the dovish regime, as we show in Proposition 3, the expectation of switching to the
hawkish regime stabilizes inﬂation ﬂuctuations; in the hawkish regime, the expectation
of switching to the dovish regime destabilizes inﬂation. Proposition 4 establishes that
the stabilizing eﬀect in the dovish regime exceeds the destabilizing eﬀect in the hawkish
regime. Moreover, the expectation eﬀect becomes more asymmetric if the shock is more
persistent, if monetary policy takes a stronger hawkish stance against inﬂation in the
hawkish regime, or if policy is less responsive to inﬂation in the dovish regime. Since
these results are derived from a simple model with ﬂexible prices, we examine below
whether or not these results survive in models with nominal and real rigidities.
III.2. The sticky-price model. We have shown that, in the ﬂexible-price model,
the possibility of regime-switching in monetary policy generates expectation eﬀects
that stabilize inﬂation in the dovish regime and destabilize it in the hawkish regime.
Furthermore, the expectation eﬀect can be asymmetric across regimes: the stabilizing
eﬀect of regime shifts tends to be larger in magnitude than the destabilizing eﬀect. Do
these results hold for economies with richer and more realistic equilibrium dynamics?
To answer this question, we study a stylized sticky-price model.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 10
Our model structure is standard in the DSGE literature (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 2005). The model features monopolistic competition in the intermediate
goods market, where ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated products set their prices in a stag-
gered fashion (Calvo, 1983). Under the Calvo price contracts, a fraction of ﬁrms can
reoptimize their pricing decisions in each period and the rest cannot. If a ﬁrm can-
not reoptimize, it is allowed to index its price to the previous period inﬂation. The
representative household consumes a ﬁnal good, which is a Dixit-Stiglitz composite
of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The household is endowed with a unit of time
and supplies labor to intermediate goods producers in a competitive labor market. We
follow the literature and allow for two sources of real rigidities in the forms of habit for-
mation in consumption and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors in production. We present the details
of the model in Appendix A.
To study the implications of regime shifts in monetary policy, we generalize the
standard DSGE model by allowing the coeﬃcients in the Taylor rule to vary with














where Rt denotes the nominal interest rate, ~ Yt denotes detrended aggregate output, ¼t
denotes inﬂation, ¼¤ denotes the inﬂation target, and the policy parameters ·st, ½r;st,
Á¼;st, and Áy;st depend on the regime st, which follows the same Markov transition
process described in (4). The term "rt is a shock to monetary policy and follows an
i.i.d. normal process with mean zero and variance ¾2
r. In addition to the monetary
policy shock, the economy is buﬀeted by three other shocks, a preference shock At that
follows the stochastic process as described in (1), a technology shock and a markup
shock to be described below. The agents observe all shocks and monetary policy regime
before making optimizing decisions.
Regime shifts in monetary policy can potentially complicate the computation of
equilibrium dynamics as the steady-state equilibrium may vary with policy regime.
We show that, with an appropriate choice of the scale parameter ·st in the interest
rate rule, the monetary authority is able to achieve its inﬂation target in the steady
state and the steady-state equilibrium is independent of policy regime. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. In steady state equilibrium, real variables such as aggregate output,
consumption, hours, and the real wage are independent of monetary policy and are
thus invariant to regime shifts in policy. Further, if the scale parameter ·st in theASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 11







where ¸ is the exogenous trend growth rate of productivity, ¯ is the subjective discount
factor, and ~ Y is the steady-state detrended output that is independent of policy, then
the steady-state nominal variables are given by ¼ = ¼¤ and R = ¸
¯¼¤, which are also
invariant to regime shifts in policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ¤
In what follows, we present log-linearized equilibrium conditions around the deter-
ministic steady state which, according to Proposition 5, is invariant to policy regime.
Log-linearizing the optimal pricing decision rule leads to the Phillips curve relation








(^ yt ¡ ^ yt¡1 + ^ ºt)
¸
+ Ã^ ¹t;; (16)
where » is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ¶ is the inﬂation-indexation
parameter, b is the habit-formation parameter, and ® is the elasticity of output with
respect to the labor input. The parameter Ã is a composite of other parameters given
by
Ã =
(1 ¡ ¯´)(1 ¡ ´)
´
1
1 + µ(1 ¡ ®)=®
;
where µ is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The
variable ^ ¼t denotes the inﬂation rate and the variable ^ yt denotes detrended output, both
are deviations from the steady-state values. The term ^ ºt ´ lnºt is the technology shock,
which follows the stationary stochastic process
lnºt = ½º lnºt¡1 + "ºt; (17)
where ½º 2 [0;1) and "ºt is a white-noise process with mean zero and variance ¾2
º.
The term ^ ¹t ´ ln(¹t=¹) is the markup shock, which follows the stationary stochastic
process
ln¹t = (1 ¡ ½¹)ln¹ + ½¹ ln¹t¡1 + "¹t; (18)
where ¹ denotes the average markup, ½¹ 2 [0;1) measures the persistence of the markup
shock, and "¹t follows an i.i.d. normal process with mean zero and variance ¾2
¹.






















(¸ ¡ b)(1 ¡ ½a)
¸
^ at; (19)ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 12
where ^ Rt denotes the deviations of the nominal interest rate from steady state.
Finally, the ﬁrst-order approximation to the interest rate rule (14) leads to
^ Rt = ½r;st ^ Rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½r;st)[Á¼;st^ ¼t + Áy;st^ yt] + "rt: (20)
To derive closed-form solutions and obtain analytical characterizations of the expec-
tation eﬀects of regime switching, we begin with a simpliﬁed version of the model with
b = ¶ = 0, ® = 1, ½r;st = 0, and Áy;st = 0 and we focus on dynamic responses of inﬂa-
tion to the preference shock.3 In Section IV we analyze the expectation eﬀects in more
general cases based on simulation results. With our simplifying assumptions about the
parameters, our model reduces to the standard three-equation New Keynesian model:
^ ¼t = ¯Et^ ¼t+1 + Ã(1 + »)^ yt; (21)
^ yt = Et^ yt+1 ¡ [ ^ Rt ¡ Et^ ¼t+1] + (1 ¡ ½a)^ at; (22)
^ Rt = Ást^ ¼t: (23)
Substituting out the variables ^ yt and ^ Rt by using (21) and (23), we obtain the second-
order diﬀerence equation
¯ Et^ ¼t+2 ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·)Et^ ¼t+1 + (1 + ·Ást)^ ¼t = ·(1 ¡ ½a)^ at; (24)
where the parameter · = Ã(1 + »).
Since ^ at is the only state variable, the MSV solution takes the form ^ ¼t = °st ^ at,
where °st is to be solved for st 2 f1;2g. The following proposition summarizes the
MSV solution in the sticky-price model.
Proposition 6. The MSV solution to the regime-switching model (24) is given by












where the matrix A, deﬁned below, is assumed to be invertible.
A =
·
·(Á1 ¡ ½aq11) + (1 ¡ ½aq11)(1 ¡ ¯½aq11) + ¯½2
aq21q12 ¡½aq21[1 ¡ ¯½aq22 + ¯(1 ¡ ½aq11) + ·]
¡½aq12[1 ¡ ¯½aq11 + ¯(1 ¡ ½aq22) + ·] ·(Á2 ¡ ½aq22) + (1 ¡ ½aq22)(1 ¡ ¯½aq22) + ¯½2
aq21q12
¸
Proof. See Appendix B.5. ¤
To obtain the expectation eﬀect of regime shifts, we compare the solution (25) with
the constant-regime solution. The next proposition establishes the constant-regime
solution.
3Our theoretical results hold for dynamic responses to other shocks.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 13
Proposition 7. The MSV solution to the model in which agents expect the particular
regime j to last forever is given by
^ ¼t = ¹ °j^ at; ¹ °j =
·(1 ¡ ½a)
(1 ¡ ½a)(1 ¡ ¯½a) + ·(Áj ¡ ½a)
; j 2 f1;2g (26)
where we assume that ·(Á1 ¡ ½a) > ¡(1 ¡ ½a)(1 ¡ ¯½a) so that ¹ °j > 0 for j 2 f1;2g.
Proof. The constant-regime solution is a special case of the model (24) with qii = 1 for
i 2 f1;2g. ¤
The following two propositions establish the existence of the expectation eﬀect. In
particular, the volatility of inﬂation in the dovish regime decreases with the probability
of switching to the hawkish regime, while the volatility in the hawkish regime increases
with the probability of switching to the dovish regime. More formally, we deﬁne the



























Proof. See Appendix B.6. ¤
Proposition 9. ¹ v¼;1 > v¼;1 and ¹ v¼;2 < v¼;2:
Proof. The proof follows directly from Appendix B.6. ¤
We have established that the expectation eﬀect can generate inﬂation dynamics
diﬀerent from those implied by the constant-parameter version of the model. We now
show that the expectation eﬀect is asymmetric even when the probability of switching
is the same for both regimes (i.e., q11 = q22). The result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 10. Assume that q11 = q22. We have
¹ v¼;1 ¡ v¼;1
v¼;2 ¡ ¹ v¼;2
=
(1 ¡ ½a)(1 ¡ ¯½a) + ·(Á2 ¡ ½a)
(1 ¡ ½a)(1 ¡ ¯½a) + ·(Á1 ¡ ½a)
> 1: (28)
Thus, as in the ﬂexible-price model, the expectation eﬀects in the sticky-price model
here stabilize inﬂation ﬂuctuations in the dovish regime and magnify inﬂation ﬂuctu-
ations in the hawkish regime. The stabilizing eﬀect exceeds the magnifying eﬀect.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 14
IV. Quantitative Importance of the Expectation Effect
The theoretical results obtained in the previous sections provide key insight into
why the expectation eﬀect exists and how it can be asymmetric across regimes. But
how important quantitatively is the expectation eﬀect of regime shifts? How does the
expectation eﬀect aﬀect equilibrium dynamics when monetary policy shifts from the
dovish regime to the hawkish regime? We address these issues using the model pre-
sented in Section III.2.4 Speciﬁcally, we allow for several diﬀerent sources of frictions
and shocks. This generalization of the model makes it diﬃcult to obtain closed-form
solutions. We solve the model (16)-(20) numerically based on the parameter values
described below. We study the expectation eﬀects of regime shifts based on the sim-
ulated dynamics. With regime-dependent coeﬃcients in the policy rule, the model is
nonlinear and the solution method becomes nonstandard. We use the solution method
developed by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006) to solve our Markov-switching ra-
tional expectations model. The speciﬁc steps that we take in solving the model are
described in appendices of the earlier version of this paper (see Liu, Waggoner, and
Zha (2007)).
To obtain numerical solutions to the model, we need to assign values to the parame-
ters. In our regime-switching model, there are two sets of parameters. The ﬁrst set of
parameters is invariant to policy regime. This set includes ¯, the subjective discount
factor; b, the habit parameter; », the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply; ®, the
elasticity of output with respect to labor; µ, the elasticity of substitution between dif-
ferentiated goods; ¸, the trend growth rate of productivity; ´, the Calvo probability
that a ﬁrm cannot re-optimize its pricing decision; ¶, the degree of inﬂation indexation;
and the parameters in the shock processes, such as ¹, ½¹, and ¾¹ for the markup shock,
½a and ¾a for the preference shock, ½º and ¾º for the technology shock, and ¾r for the
monetary policy shock. In addition, we need to assign values to the transition prob-
abilities qij for i;j 2 f1;2g. The second set of parameters is regime-dependent. This
set includes the policy parameters ½r;st, Á¼;st, and Áy;st. Since some of the frictions in
the model are not fully micro-founded, several parameters such as ´ and ¶ are likely to
vary with policy regime. In the baseline model, we treat these parameters as constant.
In Section IV.6, we study a more general case when these parameters are allowed to
depend on regime.
4This kind of model has been a workhorse for quantitative monetary analysis. See, for example,
Galí and Gertler (1999), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), Ireland (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), CEE (2005), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Del Negro, et al. (2007), and Smets and Wouters
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The baseline values of the parameters for our simulations are summarized in Table 1.
These parameter values correspond to a quarterly model. We set ¸ = 1:005 so that the
average annual growth rate of per capital GDP is 2%. We set ¯ = 0:9952 so that, given
the value of ¸, the average annual real interest rate (equal to ¸=¯) is 4%. Following the
literature, we set b = 0:75, which is in the range considered by Boldrin, Christiano, and
Fisher (2001). We set » = 2, corresponding to a Frisch elasticity of 0:5. We set ® = 0:7,
corresponding to a labor income share of 70%. The substitution-elasticity parameter µ
determines the steady-state markup and is set at 10, in line with the values used by Basu
and Fernald (2002) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). We set ´ = 0:66, so that the
price contracts last for 3 quarters on average. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005), we set ¶ = 1 as the baseline value. For the parameters governing the shock
processes, we set ½a = ½¹ = 0:9, ½º = 0 (implying a random walk technology shock
process), and ¾a = ¾¹ = ¾º = ¾r = 0:1. For the parameters in the transition matrix Q,
we set q11 = 0:95 and q22 = 0:95 (and accordingly, q21 = 0:05 and q12 = 0:05). These
parameter values imply that both regimes are highly persistent at quarterly frequency.
While we report the results based on these parameter values, our conclusions about
asymmetric expectation eﬀects hold for a wide range of values of these parameters.
To focus on policy responses to inﬂation, we set ½r = 0:55 and Áy = 0:5 in both
regimes and allow Á¼ to vary across regimes.5 In our baseline simulation, we consider
two considerably diﬀerent policies represented by Á¼;1 = 0:9 for the dovish regime and
Á¼;2 = 2:5 for the hawkish regime. These parameter values imply local equilibrium
indeterminacy if the dovish regime is to stay indeﬁnitely. In Section IV.4, we consider
an alternative conﬁguration of the policy parameters with Á¼;2 > Á¼;1 > 1 to show the
extent to which the quantitative importance of asymmetric expectation eﬀects depends
on equilibrium indeterminacy.
IV.1. Asymmetric expectation eﬀects. To gauge the importance of the expecta-
tion eﬀect when agents take into account possible switches in future policy regime,
we compare the dynamic behavior of macroeconomic variables in our regime-switching
model with that in the version of the model in which agents naively believe that the
current regime would prevail indeﬁnitely. We focus on the impulse responses of inﬂation
and output.6
5Note that our results hold even if ½r is set to zero.
6For discussions about dynamic responses of other variables, see the working paper version Liu,
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Figures 1 and 2 display the impulse responses of inﬂation and output following each
of the four shocks: the monetary policy shock (“MP”), the demand shock (“Demand”),
the markup shock (“Markup”), and the technology shock (“Tech”). Within each sub-
graph, we plot two sets of impulse responses. One set corresponds to the version of
the model where agents naively believe that the current regime will last indeﬁnitely
(the solid line), and the other set corresponds to the baseline model where agents take
regime switching into account in forming their expectations (the dashed line). The
diﬀerence between these two sets of impulse responses represents the expectation eﬀect
of regime switching in future policy. The left column of each ﬁgure displays impulse
responses conditional on the dovish regime. The right column displays the responses
conditional on the hawkish regime.
Figure 1 shows that, in the dovish regime (the left column), if agents take into
account the eﬀects of possible shifts in future regime, the responses of inﬂation to the
demand shock and the markup shock are substantially dampened relative to those in
the model in which agents naively believe that the dovish regime would last indeﬁnitely.
As one can see, even if the probability that policy switches to the hawkish regime is
modest at 5%, the expectation eﬀect is quantitatively strong. If the dovish regime is
less persistent so that it is more likely to switch to the hawkish regime, we ﬁnd that
the expectation eﬀect is even stronger (nor reported here). Following the monetary
policy shock and the technology shock, however, the expectation eﬀects seem to be
less pronounced. In the hawkish regime (the right column), when agents take into
account the possibility of regime switching in the future, the responses of inﬂation are
slightly ampliﬁed compared to those in the constant-regime model. The ampliﬁcation
eﬀect in the hawkish regime is much weaker than the stabilizing eﬀect in the dovish
regime. This asymmetry of expectation eﬀects arises because the existence of the
hawkish regime and the possibility that policy may switch to that regime in the future
help anchor agents’ inﬂation expectations. This ﬁnding is consistent with the view that
U.S. monetary policy since mid-1980s has been eﬀective in stabilizing inﬂation despite
the belief that this hawkish policy may not last forever (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997;
Mishkin, 2004; Goodfriend and King, 2005).
Figure 2 displays the impulse responses of output. As in the case with inﬂation, the
expectation eﬀect substantially dampens the responses of output in the dovish regime
(in particular, following demand and markup shocks) and slightly ampliﬁes output
responses in the hawkish regime. Thus, the asymmetry of expectation eﬀects holds for
output as well, although to a lesser extent than it does for inﬂation.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 17
To gauge the quantitative importance of the expectation eﬀect and the magnitude
of its asymmetry across regimes, we compute the volatilities of inﬂation and output.
The volatilities are derived from the solution to our structural model, which takes the
following reduced form
xt = G1;stxt¡1 + G2;st²t; (29)
where the matrices G1;st and G2;st are functions of the structural parameters. To
derive the unconditional volatility of xt for regime j (j = 1;2), we ﬁx G1;st = G1;j and









The unconditional volatility of xt in regime j is measured by the square root of the
diagonal of ­tot
j . The ﬁrst two elements of xt are inﬂation and output; their volatilities
are reported in Table 2.
A strong expectation eﬀect in the dovish regime and the lack of it in the hawkish
regime are evident by comparing the results across Panels A and B in Table 2. In the
dovish regime, the expectation of a shift to the hawkish regime lowers macroeconomic
volatility, especially inﬂation volatility. The table shows that, when the expectation
eﬀect is taken into account, the unconditional volatility of inﬂation is lowered by about
60% (from 0:33 to 0:13). The output volatility is also reduced, although to a lesser
extent (about a 24% reduction). In comparison, in the hawkish regime, the expectation
of a shift to the dovish regime in the future has a much smaller eﬀect on macroeconomic
volatility: the volatilities of inﬂation and output are raised by only 17% and 3%,
respectively. In a number of other experiments, we ﬁnd that the expectation eﬀect
in the hawkish regime remains small even if that regime is much less persistent (e.g.,
when q22 = 0:7); on the other hand, the expectation eﬀect in the dovish regime remains
strong even if we set q11 = 0:98 and q22 = 1:0, the probabilities that might ﬁt into some
researchers’ a priori belief.
IV.2. Endogenous propagation. Endogenous propagation mechanisms in our model
play an important role in generating asymmetric expectation eﬀects both in level and
proportionally. A weaker propagation mechanism gives rise to less persistent dynamics
of inﬂation and output and therefor smaller and less asymmetric expectation eﬀects.
To see this point, we turn oﬀ endogenous propagation mechanisms by setting b =
¶ = 0 and ® = 1. To obtain closed form solutions, we also set ½r = Áy = 0. It follows
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is proportionally symmetric across regimes.7 More formally, we have
¹ v¼;1 ¡ v¼;1
¹ v¼;1
=
v¼;2 ¡ ¹ v¼;2
¹ v¼;2
:
We have experimented with several alternative parameterizations of the model in which
we weaken the strategic complementarity in price setting by making the duration of
price contracts shorter or the demand elasticity smaller. With weaker strategic comple-
mentarity, the slope of the Phillips curve measured by the parameter Ã in (16) becomes
steeper and the model’s propagation mechanism becomes weaker. We ﬁnd that, under
these alternative parameterizations, the expectation eﬀect becomes smaller and less
asymmetric (see our working paper Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2007) for more details).
These results underscore the important role of a strong propagation mechanism in
asymmetric expectation eﬀects, as the model with habit formation, dynamic indexa-
tion, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors produces more persistence in the dynamics of inﬂation
and output and thus stronger asymmetry of expectation eﬀects, as shown in Section
IV.1.
IV.3. Less persistent shocks. Figures 1 and 2 show that the expectation eﬀect is
much larger for dynamic responses to demand and markup shocks than for responses to
policy and technology shocks. Since demand and markup shocks are more persistent,
one would like to know to what extent the asymmetry and the quantitative impor-
tance of expectation eﬀects depend upon the persistence of these shocks. To address
this question, we consider the model with i.i.d. shocks by setting the persistence pa-
rameters in all the shock processes to zero. We ﬁnd that the expectation eﬀect remains
asymmetric. For instance, with our parameterizations and i.i.d. shocks, the expecta-
tion eﬀect reduces inﬂation volatility by about 14% in the dovish regime; in contrast,
in the hawkish regime, it ampliﬁes inﬂation volatility by less than 5%.
IV.4. Equilibrium determinacy. In our baseline parameterization, Á¼;1 < 1 violates
the Taylor principle, implying local equilibrium indeterminacy if the dovish regime were
to last indeﬁnitely. As we have argued, the expectation eﬀect arises not because one of
the regimes would lead to indeterminacy in that regime; the asymmetric expectation
eﬀect exists as long as the two policy regimes diﬀer in their aggressiveness against
inﬂation ﬂuctuations.
To make this point concrete, we set Á¼;1 = 1:2 and Á¼;2 = 5 (instead of 0:9 and
2:5 used in the baseline mdoel), while keeping all other parameters the same. With
this variation, the interest rate rule satisﬁes the Taylor principle and the equilibrium is
7The same conclusion holds for the ﬂexible-price model presented in Section III.1.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 19
unique in both regimes. Table 3 reports the volatility results. It is evident that although
there is no issue of indeterminacy here, the expectation eﬀect of regime switching
remains quantitatively important under the dovish regime (especially for inﬂation),
while it is much less important in the hawkish regime.
IV.5. Transition dynamics. In our discussion so far, we have focused on the expec-
tation eﬀects conditional on each policy regime. It is of interest to understand the
expectation eﬀects when policy regime actually switches. Suppose, for example, that
dovish policy in the previous period t ¡ 1 switches to hawkish policy in the current
period t. To examine the impact of this actual regime shift on dynamic responses
to fundamental shocks and on expectation eﬀects, we compare impulse responses un-
der two diﬀerent scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, agents believe that such a regime
shift is permanent (i.e., policy stays hawkish from period t on). In the second sce-
nario, agents understand that policy switches between the two regimes according to
the Markov-switching process. In the absence of fundamental shocks, as we have shown
in Proposition 5, a regime shift does not by itself aﬀect equilibrium variables. What
will be aﬀected is dynamics responses to a particular shock that occurs at the same
time when policy regime switches in the impact period t. Diﬀerences between the im-
pulse responses under the two scenarios capture the expectation eﬀects when policy
actually shifts from one regime to the other.
Figure 3 displays impulse responses of inﬂation and output to a demand shock when
policy regime switches in the impact period.8 The solid lines represent the responses
when agents naively believe that the regime shift is permanent. The dashed lines
represent the responses when agents understand that policy switches between the two
regimes in subsequent periods according to the Markov-switching process.9 As shown in
the ﬁgure, when policy switches from the hawkish to the dovish regime, the responses of
inﬂation and output to a demand shock are substantially dampened when agents take
into account possible future regime shifts; when policy switches from the dovish to the
hawkish regime, the responses are slightly magniﬁed (noticing the diﬀerent scales) as
agents take account of the probability of regime switches in the future. Thus, with the
8To conserve space, we focus on the impulse responses to a demand shock. Our conclusion does
not change when we consider responses to a markup shock. Again, monetary policy and technology
shocks do not seem to generate quantitatively important expectation eﬀects.
9The impulse responses without expectation eﬀects (the solid lines) are, by construction, identical
to those in the baseline model. The responses with expectation eﬀects (the dashed lines) are the
means of 100000 simulations of inﬂation and output dynamics. These simulations are generated by
randomly drawing both structural shocks and regimes.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 20
actual switch in policy regime taking place, the expectation eﬀects remain asymmetric
and can be quantitatively important. Compared to the impulse responses that are
computed conditional on each regime (Figures 1 and 2), the responses of inﬂation
and output are further dampened if the policy switches to the dovish regime and the
responses are slightly ampliﬁed if the policy switches to the hawkish regime. These
results are obtained based on the Markov transition probabilities q11 = q22 = 0:95 so
that a given regime lasts on average for 20 quarters. When policy regime switches more
frequently (e.g, when the q’s are 0:85, implying an average duration of each regime of
about 7 quarters), we ﬁnd that the actual switch to the dovish regime generates larger
expectation eﬀects and the expectation eﬀects become even more asymmetric (not
reported here).
IV.6. Regime-dependent structural parameters. Some of the parameters in the
model are not deep parameters and are thus likely to vary with policy regime. Examples
include the Calvo sticky-price parameter ´ and the inﬂation indexation parameter
¶. For comparison with the literature, we have so far treated these parameters as
independent of policy regime. We now examine how expectation eﬀects can be aﬀected
if these parameters are allowed to be regime-dependent. Speciﬁcally, we replace the
constant parameters ´ and ¶ by the regime-dependent parameters ´(st¡1) and ¶(st¡1).
For the same reason as in our baseline DSGE model, the steady-state equilibrium does
not depend on policy regime.10
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions around the steady state are similar to those
in the baseline model, except that the Phillips curve relation becomes more general and
is given by








(^ yt ¡ ^ yt¡1 + ^ ºt)
¸








(1 ¡ ¯¹ ´)(1 ¡ ´(st¡1))
´(st¡1)
1
1 + µp(1 ¡ ®)=®
:
10This result holds because the regime-dependent parameters aﬀect nominal rigidities only and
have no eﬀects on real variables in the steady state. If we allow for regime-dependence of some
parameters that represent real frictions (such as the habit persistence parameter), a diﬀerent approach
is needed to obtain the deterministic steady state. This issue is important enough to deserve a separate
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Note that ¹ ´ is the ergodic mean of the random variable ´(st).11
We assume that in the dovish regime ﬁrms adjust prices more frequently and, for
those who cannot re-optimize pricing, they index to past inﬂation more heavily than
in the hawkish regime. This assumption seems plausible as inﬂation is likely higher
and more volatile in the dovish regime than in the hawkish regime. In particular, we
set ´(1) = 0:66 and ´(2) = 0:75, so that price contracts last on average for 3 quarters
under the dovish regime and 4 quarters under the hawkish regime; we set ¶(1) = 1 and
¶(2) = 0, so that there is full indexation under the dovish regime and no indexation
under the hawkish regime.12 All other parameter values remain the same as in the
baseline model.
Figure 4 displays impulse responses of inﬂation and output to a demand shock.
The solid lines represent the impulse responses without expectation eﬀects and the
dashed lines represent those with expectation eﬀects. The ﬁgure shows that, as in the
baseline model, expectation eﬀects help stabilize inﬂation and output under the dovish
regime and amplify ﬂuctuations under the hawkish regime. The expectation eﬀects are
asymmetric because the stabilizing eﬀect is larger than the amplifying eﬀect. Thus,
allowing the price stickiness parameter and the inﬂation indexation parameter to vary
with policy regime supports our general conclusion about existence and asymmetry of
the expectation eﬀects. A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 indicates that a generalization
of these parameter values strengthens the quantitative importance and asymmetry of
expectation eﬀects obtained for our baseline model.
V. Conclusion
We have studied two canonical DSGE models with monetary policy following a
Markov-switching process between a dovish regime and a hawkish regime, where mon-
etary policy in the hawkish regime responds to inﬂation more strongly than in the
dovish regime. We have shown, in theory and through simulations, that (1) because
inﬂation expectations can be inﬂuenced, in a nonlinear way, either by hawkish policy
itself or through the expectation of a switch to this policy in the future, the expecta-
tion eﬀect is asymmetric across regimes; (2) in the dovish regime, the expectation eﬀect
11For derivations of this equation and other details about the model’s optimizing conditions when
´ and ¶ are regime-dependent, see the earlier version of this paper (Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2007)).
12Ideally, these regime-switching parameters should be estimated along with the policy parameters
and other deep parameters in the DSGE model. Although estimation of the model parameters is
beyond the scope of the paper, the ad hoc parameter values that we use here help illustrate the
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can be quantitatively important, a theoretical result consistent with the evidence that
changes in policy regime may not be a main source of substantial volatility reductions
observed in macroeconomic time series; and (3) in the hawkish regime, on the other
hand, the expectation eﬀect of a change in future policy is quantitatively less impor-
tant. The asymmetry of expectation eﬀects across the two policy regimes oﬀers one
plausible explanation of why the post-1982 monetary policy in the United States has
been successful in reducing the volatility of both inﬂation and output, despite agents’
disbelief that hawkish policy will prevail indeﬁnitely (Goodfriend and King, 2005).
Our ﬁnding that the expectation eﬀect can be quantitatively important provides a
clear argument for continuing the existing line of research on Markov-switching DSGE
models that explicitly incorporate the possibility of regime shifts in agent’s information
set. A more ambitious task is to estimate a regime-switching DSGE model with a long
data sample that covers diﬀerent policy regimes. Some progress has been made in this
direction (Liu, Waggoner, and Zha, 2008). We believe that this line of research can be
both important and fruitful.
Appendix A. The Sticky Price Model
The model economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived identical house-
holds, each endowed with a unit of labor time; and a continuum of ﬁrms, each producing
a diﬀerentiated product using labor as the input. The representative household con-
sumes a composite good, which is produced in a perfectly competitive aggregation sec-
tor using all diﬀerentiated products as inputs. In each period, rational agents observe
the realization of shocks and the monetary policy regime before making optimizing
decisions.















subject to the sequence of budget constraints
¹ PtCt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 · WtLt + Bt + ¦t; (A2)
for t ¸ 0. In the expressions above, Ct denotes consumption, ¹ Ct¡1 is the lagged
aggregate consumption, b ¸ 0 measures the importance of habit formation, Lt denotes
labor, At denotes the preference shock, Bt+1 denotes a state-contingent nominal bond
that represents a claim to one dollar in a particular event in period t + 1 and costs
Dt;t+1 dollars in period t, ¹ Pt denotes the price level, Wt denotes the nominal wage, and
¦t denotes the proﬁt share. The term E is an expectation operator, the parameterASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 23
¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, » is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, and ª is the relative weight of leisure in the utility function. The preference
shock At follows the stochastic process described in (1).
The ﬁnal consumption good is produced in the perfectly competitive aggregation











where Yt(j) denotes the type-j intermediate good and µt > 1 is the elasticity of substi-
tution between the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The price markup is measured




















The production function for ﬁrm j 2 [0;1] is given by
Yt(j) = ZtLt(j)
®: (A6)
Following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), we assume that ﬁrms’ production
requires both labor and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (such as land or capital stock that is
inelastically supplied) so that ® 2 (0;1]. The technology shock Zt follows the stochastic
process
Zt = Zt¡1¸ºt; (A7)
where ¸ measures the deterministic trend of Zt and ºt is a stochastic component of Zt.
The stochastic component follows the stationary process described in (17).
Firms in the intermediate good sector are price-takers in the input market and mo-
nopolistic competitors in the product markets. They set prices for their diﬀerentiated
products in a staggered fashion. Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in each pe-
riod, each ﬁrm receives a random i.i.d. signal that enables the ﬁrm to set a new price.
The probability that a ﬁrm cannot adjust its price is ´. By the law of large numbers,
a fraction 1 ¡ ´ of ﬁrms in a given period can optimize their pricing decisions while
the remaining ﬁrms cannot. Following Woodford (2003), CEE (2005), and Smets and
Wouters (2007), we allow a fraction ¶ of ﬁrms that cannot re-optimize their pricingASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 24
decisions to index their prices to the overall price inﬂation realized in the past period.





where ¼t = ¹ Pt= ¹ Pt¡1 is the inﬂation rate between t ¡ 1 and t, ¼ is the steady-state
inﬂation rate, and ¶ measures the degree of indexation. If the ﬁrm j can set a new
















subject to the demand schedule (A4). The term Dt;t+i is the period-t present value of a
dollar in a future state in period t+i and the term Ât;t+i comes from the price-updating






t¼(1¡¶)i if i ¸ 1;
1 if i = 0:
(A10)
The monetary authority follows the interest-rate rule described in (14), where the
coeﬃcients depend on policy regime and there is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock "rt.
All the structural shocks "rt, "at, "¹t, and "ºt are assumed to be mutually independent.
Given monetary policy, an equilibrium in this economy consists of prices and allo-
cations such that (i) taking prices as given, the representative household’s allocations
solve its utility maximizing problem; (ii) taking all prices but its own as given, each
ﬁrm’s allocation and price solve its proﬁt maximizing problem; (iii) markets clear for
bond, money balances, labor, and composite ﬁnal goods.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the household’s utility maximization problem
result in the labor supply equation
Wt
¹ Pt
= ª(Ct ¡ bCt¡1)L
»
t (A11)



















[¹t+i©t+i(j) ¡ Pt(j)Ât;t+i] = 0; (A13)
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Because the productivity shock Zt in the model contains a trend, we focus on a
stationary equilibrium (i.e., the balanced growth path). In the stationary equilibrium,
aggregate output, consumption, and the real wage grow at the same rate as does the
productivity, while hours do not grow. To induce stationarity, we divide each of the
growing variables by Zt and denote the resulting stationary counterpart of the variable
Xt by ~ Xt = Xt=Zt.
A.1. The Steady State Equilibrium. We now derive the steady-state equilibrium
solution and prove the result in Proposition 5. In the steady state, all the structural
shocks are turned oﬀ. The steady-state equilibrium can be summarized by the solution
to the four equilibrium conditions: the optimal pricing decision (A13), the labor supply
equation (A11), the intertemporal Euler equation (A12), and the Taylor rule (14).
The optimal pricing equation (A13) implies that, in the steady state, the real mar-






~ W ~ Y
1=®¡1; (A15)
where ~ W = W
PZ denotes the transformed real wage and ~ Y = Y
Z denotes transformed
output.
The labor supply equation (A11) implies that the real wage in the steady state equals
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS):









where we have used the goods market clearing condition that ~ C = ~ Y and the aggregate
production function that L = ~ Y .
The household’s optimal intertemporal decision (A12) implies that, in the steady-














The steady-state equilibrium features the classical dichotomy. The real variables ~ Y
and ~ W are determined by Equations (A15) and (A16). Upon obtaining the solution
for ~ Y , we can use the production function and the goods market clearing condition to
get the steady-state hours and consumption: L = ~ C = ~ Y . Evidently, the steady-state
values of the real variables are independent of policy regime. The nominal variables
¼ and R, on the other hand, can be solved from Equations (A17) and (A18) once theASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 26
real variables are determined. We claim in Proposition 5 that, by appropriate choice
of the scale parameter ·(s), the monetary authority will be able to achieve its inﬂation
target in the steady state so that ¼ = ¼¤. Then, Equation (A17) gives the solution for
the steady-state nominal interest rate: R = ¸
¯¼¤. Thus, the steady-state values of the
nominal variables ¼ and R are independent of policy regime either. The restriction on
the scale parameter ·(s) described in (15) comes from (A18). This proves Proposition
5.
Appendix B. Proofs of Other Propositions
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1. We solve the model (8) by the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. Given the solution form ^ ¼t = ®st^ at for st 2 f1;2g, (8) implies that
Á1®1^ at = q11®1½a^ at + q21®2½a^ at + °(1 ¡ ½a)^ at;
Á2®2^ at = q12®1½a^ at + q22®2½a^ at + °(1 ¡ ½a)^ at;
where we have used the relation Et^ at+1 = ½a^ at. Matching the coeﬃcients on ^ at, we
obtain
Á1®1 = q11®1½a + q21®2½a + °(1 ¡ ½a); (A19)
Á2®2 = q12®1½a + q22®2½a + °(1 ¡ ½a): (A20)
It follows that the solution [®1;®2]0 is given by the expression in (9).
B.2. Proof of Proposition 2. Given the solution form ^ ¼t = ¹ ®j^ at, we have Et^ ¼t+1 =
¹ ®j½a^ at and (11) is a result from matching the coeﬃcients of ^ at.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3. Denote by ® = [®1;®2]0 and C = °(1 ¡ ½a)[1;1]0. The
MSV solution in (9) can be rewritten as
® = A
¡1C:
Since the assumption that Á2 > Á1 > ½a implies that A is positive deﬁnite, ®1 and ®2
are both positive.
To establish the ﬁrst inequality in (12), we use the relation q11 = 1 ¡ q21 and diﬀer-
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°½a(1 ¡ ½a)(Á2 ¡ q22½a)(Á1 ¡ Á2)
det(A)2 < 0;









@q12 > 0 then follows from the assumption Á2 > Á1 > ½a.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 4. The solution for the regime-switching model (9) can
be rewritten as
®j =
(qij½a + Ái ¡ qii½a)°(1 ¡ ½a)
det(A)
; ij 2 f1;2g; i 6= j:
Using the solution for the constant regime model in (11), we have
¹ ®1 ¡ ®1












det(A) ¡ (Á1 ¡ ½a)(q21½a + Á2 ¡ q22½a)







The desired inequality in (13) follows from the assumptions that q11 = q22 and Á2 > Á1.
B.5. Proof of Proposition 6. We solve the model (24) by using the method of










22 + q21q12) + °1q12(q11 + q22)] ¡ ½a(1 + ¯ + ·)(°2q22 + °1q12) + (1 + ·Á2)°2 = ·(1 ¡ ½a);
where we have used the Markov transition property of the regime switching process
and the AR(1) property of the shock and we have also matched the coeﬃcients for ^ at
in each equation. Collecting terms, we obtain the solution (25).
B.6. Proof of Proposition 8. The MSV solution (25) can be written in a compact
form A° = B, where ° = [°1;°2]0 and B = [1;1]0·(1 ¡ ½a). Total diﬀerentiation with










° = (°2 ¡ °1)
"





·2(1 ¡ ½a)(Á1 ¡ Á2)
det(A)
"


















2 ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·)½aq22 + 1 + ·Á2][¯½
2
a(q11 + q22 ¡ q21) ¡ ½a(1 + ¯ + ·)]
ª
< 0:
where the last inequality follows since Á2 > Á1 and, given that Á2 > 1, the term in the
ﬁrst square bracket is positive (while the term in the second square bracket is clearly
negative).













2 ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·)½aq11 + 1 + ·Á1][¯½
2
a(q11 + q22 ¡ q12) ¡ ½a(1 + ¯ + ·)]
ª
:
Since Á1 < Á2 and the term in the last square bracket is negative, to show that
@°2
@q12 > 0,
it is suﬃcient to establish that ¯(½aq11)2 ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·)½aq11 + 1 + ·Á1 > 0. The
desired inequality follows from the assumption in Proposition 7 that ·(Á1 ¡ ½a) >
¡(1 ¡ ½a)(1 ¡ ¯½a) (so that ¹ °1 > 0).ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 29
Table 1. Constant parameters
Preference ¯ = 0:9952 » = 2 b = 0:75
Technology ® = 0:7 ¸ = 1:005 µ = 10
Price setting ´ = 0:66 ¶ = 1
Policy rule ½r = 0:55 Áy = 0:5
Aggregate Shocks
Persistence ½a = 0:9 ½¹ = 0:9 ½º = 0
Standard dev. ¾r = 0:1 ¾a = 0:1 ¾¹ = 0:1 ¾º = 0:1
Regime transition prob. q11 = 0:95 q22 = 0:95
Table 2. Eﬀects of regime shifts on macroeconomic volatility ( baseline:
Á¼;1 = 0:9 and Á¼;2 = 2:5)








Table 3. Eﬀects of regime shifts on macroeconomic volatility ( deter-
minacy: Á¼;1 = 1:2 and Á¼;2 = 5)




B. Accounting for Expectation Eﬀects
Regime Inﬂation Output
Dovish 0.062 0.096



















































Figure 1. Impulse responses of inﬂation to various shocks in the base-
line model. The solid lines represent the responses without expectation

















































Figure 2. Impulse responses of output to various shocks in the base-
line model. The solid lines represent the responses without expectation











































Figure 3. Impulse responses of inﬂation and output to a demand shock
in the baseline model when policy actually switches regime in the im-
pact period. The solid lines represent the responses without expectation









































Figure 4. Impulse responses of inﬂation and output to a demand shock
in the model with regime-dependent nominal rigidity parameters. The
solid lines represent the responses without expectation eﬀects. The
dashed lines represent the responses with expectation eﬀects.ASYMMETRIC EXPECTATION EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS 33
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